Employment and the “Investment Gap”: An Econometric Model of European Imbalances by Campiglio, Luigi Pierfranco
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Employment and the “Investment Gap”:
An Econometric Model of European
Imbalances
Luigi Pierfranco Campiglio
May 2015
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/64113/
MPRA Paper No. 64113, posted 5. May 2015 06:06 UTC
 1 
                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         
 
                Employment and the “Investment Gap”: 
                    An Econometric Model of European Imbalances 
 
          Luigi Campiglio 
 
                 April 2015 
 
 
        Catholic University of the Sacred Heart 
 
            Milan 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
  
INDEX 
 
1. Introduction 
2. Stylized Facts and Data Description 
3. Model Specifications 
4. Empirical Results and Policy Implications 
4.1. Policy Implications 
4.1.1. Employment and the “Investment Gap” 
4.1.2. Unemployment and the “Investment Gap” 
4.1.3. The Role of Public Investments 
4.2. Causes of the European Recession 
4.2.1. Consumption Slump 
4.2.2. Structural Breaks and Precautionary Saving 
4.2.3. Investment Slump 
4.3. Consequences of the European Recession 
4.3.1. Unemployment-Current Account Trade-Off 
4.3.2. Inflation gap and threshold of nominal price rigidity 
4.3.3. Germany’s exports model 
5. Conclusions 
6. References 
7. Appendix 
A. Tables of data 
B. Tables of auxiliary estimates 
C. Figures 
Legend                                   
                                  
 
 3 
 
Employment and the “Investment Gap” 
                An Econometric Model of European Imbalances 
 
        Luigi Campiglio 
                                                            Abstract 
 
 We specify a VEC model based on six main macroeconomic imbalances to explain 
the Great European Recession, in Germany, France, Spain and Italy, from 1999 to 
2013, estimating their long-term relationships. We focus on employment and 
unemployment as the main imbalances and identify consumption and investment 
slumps, prompted by fiscal consolidation, as the causes and current account rebalance 
and low inflation as the main consequences. Our main results are the following: a) 
public investment is the main policy instrument which can foster employment, 
prompting private investment and growth, exports can only partly balance a falling 
domestic demand; b) the unemployment-current account trade-off is a structural 
constraint to a lower unemployment level; c) mild deflation set in as a consequence 
of the consumption slump and oil price decline; d) breaks dates for consumption and 
inflation thresholds are estimated; and e) Germany successfully passed through the 
European recession by sharply increasing its exports and reshaping its economic role. 
 
JEL Classifications: E21, E22, E24, E31, F32, F45, O52 
Keywords: Europe, employment, unemployment, consumption, investment, 
current account, inflation.  
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Unemployment and the “Investment Gap” 
             An Econometric Model of European Imbalances 
 
 Luigi Campiglio 
1. Introduction  
 
Unlike the U.S. Great Recession that began in 2008, Europe went through a 
second recession in 2012-2013 stemming from the sovereign debt crisis: public debt, 
as a ratio to GDP, has steadily increased since 2008 as consequence of slowing or 
declining GDP.  
The timing of the fiscal consolidation, implemented to reduce the public 
debt/GDP ratio, has been increasingly questioned: the issue is whether public debt 
reduction pursued with austerity measures can promote economic growth or, vice 
versa, whether an expansionary fiscal policy in a depressed economy could be self-
financing, promoting economic growth and public debt reduction (De Long and 
Summers (2012). The implementation of the first policy option, after two years of 
recession and an increasing public debt to GDP ratio, has cast serious doubts on its 
effectiveness, prompting a more careful analysis of the second option, at which our 
paper is aimed.  
The economic debate has been primarily focused on the value of the fiscal 
multiplier: as Ramey’s survey (2011) shows, its value for a temporary, deficit 
financed increase, the type of stimulus package adopted in the US, has a wide range 
of estimates, from 0.8 to 1.5. Moreover, a single multiplier is a weighted average 
between a period of expansion and recession, with the further constraint that deep 
recessions are few, with nonlinearities hard to estimate (Parker, 2011). Blanchard and 
Leigh (2011,2013) find a negative relationship between growth forecast errors and 
planned fiscal consolidations during the crisis, mainly in Europe, implying a higher 
than expected fiscal multiplier. They note that the “forecaster significantly 
underestimated the increase in unemployment and the decline in private consumption 
and investment”, with the consequence that consumption came to depend much more 
on current rather than future income, while investment depended more on current 
rather than future profits. Problems of nonlinearity of impulse responses have been 
addressed with an econometric procedure proposed by Jordà (2005) on episodes of 
prolonged recessions: empirical results imply medium-term multipliers, over five 
years, of -2 for output, -3 for employment and 1,5 for unemployment (Dell’Erba, 
Koloskova, Poplawski-Ribeiro, 2014).  
In Europe, the economic debate is more focused on the value of the “output gap”, 
which is the difference between the potential output and the effective output: the 
“output gap” is the cornerstone on which the cyclical adjusted budget is measured 
and the national fiscal policies are approved and implemented. A crucial intermediate 
step is the estimate of the NAWRU (Non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment),  
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 a concept related to the NAIRU (Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) 
from which an equilibrium unemployment rate can be derived, to map the labour 
force in potential employment and potential output (Havick et al., 2014). 
This paper argues instead that economic policy should be focused on filling the 
“Investment Gap”, defined as the gap of investments necessary to increase 
employment and reduce unemployment at the pre-crisis levels: investments are also 
the carrier of innovation, increasing productivity and better standards of living. 
These different strands of research converge when looking to the impact of 
government expenditures on the employment/unemployment relationship. A positive 
and significant relationship is estimated in the US, where it is estimated that an 
increase of government spending of 1 percent of GDP prompts an employment 
multiplier of approximately 1,5 at its peak. Interestingly, the authors find that their 
results hold when complementarity between consumption and employment is coupled 
with price stickiness (Monacelli, Perotti, Trigari, 2010). In the US, the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, focused heavily on infrastructure 
spending and fiscal aid to state governments, allowed a more careful analysis of the 
positive impact of stimulus funds, estimated at $125.000 per job (Wilson, 2012). 
In Europe, the research pattern is similar, coupling fiscal consolidation with its 
effects on employment (Escudero and Mourelo, 2014), as well as a straightforward 
approach to the relationship between investment and growth (DIW Economic 
Bulletin, 2014) and public investment and growth, through the stimulus to the 
domestic demand and the spillover on other European countries (Elekdag and Muir, 
2014). 
The paper is focused on unemployment and employment as the primary social 
goals, whose improvement is required for a generalized economic recovery in 
Europe: we unbundle the main causes and consequences of the Great European 
Recession to provide a framework for our economic policy implications. 
The plan for our paper is the following. Section 2 presents stylized facts about 
the European crisis and a description of the data used for the econometric estimates, 
section 3 details the model specification, and section 4 covers, in three sub-sections, 
the suggested interpretation for the Great European Recession and the related policy 
implications. Section 4.1 analyses policy implications, namely the investment-
employment and unemployment relationships, section 4.2 identifies the consumption 
and investment slumps as the main causes of the recession, when and why structural 
breaks occurred, and section 4.3 analyses the consequences: the sharp inflation drop, 
the unemployment-current account relationship, and the role of Germany and of its 
success through the second European recession (Burda et al. 2011; Dustman et al. 
2014). 
 
2. Stylized facts and data description 
The Sovereign Debt Crisis, following the US crisis of 2008, prompted a second 
recession in the European Southern countries: the main consequence has been a 
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sudden stop of the economic convergence between European countries. The bigger 
countries with a significant GDP loss, between 2000 and 2013, were Italy and Spain, 
and, among the smaller countries, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus. Around one third of 
the EU population lost a sizable volume of GDP. Germany was the country with the 
biggest GDP improvement, together with the U.K. and France (Table A.2).  
The GDP divergence was mirrored by an increasing gap between countries 
whose unemployment rates rose sharply, such as Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal, 
and countries where the unemployment rate remained at a low level or even declined, 
such as Germany, Austria, and Luxembourg. The unemployment rate in France 
increased only slightly, but at a rather high level. As a consequence, between 2008 
and 2014, the simple standard deviation of the unemployment rates inside the 
European Union (28) tripled, while the weighted standard deviation quadrupled.  
The increasing economic and financial interconnectedness between European 
countries, a primary achievement of the normal times, has been the root of the 
European economic divide as well as of the contagion and systemic instability in the 
countries more severely hit. The degree of resilience of some countries is now the 
most serious issue for the EU because of the impending slow growth, or even 
stagnation: the basic question is how long it will take to regain pre-crisis levels. The 
normal business-cycle pattern after WW II—long sustained growth and short 
recession—has been overturned by a long period of recession and a slow recovery. 
The case of Italy (figure 1) exemplifies a problem common to other countries. 
The double-dip recession, in 2009 and 2011-2014, reduced by 15 years the 
levels of domestic consumption and investment: as suggested by figure 1, export 
increases were not sufficient to balance the reduction in domestic consumption. The 
long period of steady investment decline may have reduced the potential output and 
the prospects of a rapid unemployment reduction. The crucial question is therefore 
how long it will take, in Italy and other countries, to return to pre-2008 economic 
levels, avoiding the trap of low growth.  
Overall, the investment volume for the EU (28) countries remained stable over 
the 2000-2013 period (-0.2%), going through an upswing of +20% from 2000 to 2008, 
and a sharp slowdown of -17% from 2008 to 2013. The investment slump after 2008 
was widespread in all European countries, with many countries cancelling out, partly 
or totally, the increase achieved from 2000 to 2008: France still ended up with a 
significant increase, Germany and U.K. returned to the same level of 2000, while in 
Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, investment fell significantly over the entire period. 
Poland was the only country where investment increased before and after the crisis.  
The main economic consequence of the European recession was a sudden stop 
of the previous economic achievements in terms of convergence, reflected in the 
prolonged economic slowdown for one third of the European population. The chain 
reaction of the crisis is not yet over and, since the end of 2014, has taken the form of 
a creeping risk of deflation.  
To analyse causes, consequences and economic policy implications of the 
European crisis, we selected four major European countries—Germany, Spain, 
France and Italy—which account for 77% of the Euro Zone GDP and can represent 
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the different behaviours and interactions within the Euro Zone before and after the 
2008 crisis. We chose to select six main variables, for which we had available 
homogenous series of quarterly data, from 1999q1 to 2013q4, for each country: they 
are the main economic imbalances on which our analysis is based. Two of these 
imbalances are included in the scoreboard of the European Union Alert Mechanism. 
Data are from Eurostat, according to the ESA95 system of accounts: ESA2010 has 
been introduced at the end of 2014. Tables and figures including recent data for 2014 
are, for homogeneity, from ESA2010. A detailed list and explanation of the variables 
is available in the Legend in the Appendix. 
 
Figure 1  
 
Source: our calculations on the Eurostat database 
3. Model specification 
To unbundle the inside mechanisms of the Great European Recession, we 
chose to focus on a subset of economic variables that measure the main economic 
imbalances brought about by the crisis: employment, unemployment, consumption, 
investments, current account and inflation. 
We posit a demand-driven casual chain: the drop of domestic final 
consumption drives the fall of investment, and as a consequence an increase in 
unemployment and a slowdown in employment. Furthermore, we track the chain of 
reactions on the current account balance and the falling inflation rates. Finally, we 
exploit the employment/unemployment relationship with investments and exports to 
analyse the main policy implications of our results.  
To model and check this casual chain, we proceed with a two-level estimation 
strategy. First of all, we set up a basic Vector Error Correction Model, for each 
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variables and each country, with the purpose of identifying the long-term elasticities 
for each relationship and comparing them between the four countries on the basis of 
the same specification. The investment equation was instead estimated with an OLS 
because no valid VECM specification could be identified: we will suggest an 
economic interpretation about this. 
  Then, we proceed to an in-depth examination of two equations—consumption 
and inflation—to test their robustness. Inflation was also estimated with SUR to 
detect the economic interactions between the four countries and the role of domestic 
consumption on the inflation slowdown. We also tested the role of households saving 
for consumption with an OLS specification and both consumption and inflation were 
tested for breaks. 
The robustness of the parameter estimates over the entire period, 1999-2013, is 
heavily influenced by the economic shock of 2008, while estimates over the period 
2008-2013 are carried out with a smaller number of observations.  
For a neater presentation of the VEC specifications, we exclude lags, whose 
length is instead shown in each table with the summary estimates of the long-term 
elasticities: all variable are in log, thus measuring elasticities. With the exception of 
the investment equation, estimated with OLS, the VEC specification is estimated 
with the Johansen procedure. The following equation numbering is organized to 
match the number of the corresponding tables, which summarize the long-term 
estimates, and to avoid cumbersome notation we use the same subscripts for each 
equation. Auxiliary specifications are in the Appendix. 
 
∆𝐸𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼2∆𝑋𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐸𝑡−1 − 𝛽1𝐼𝑡−1 − 𝛽2𝑋𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑡                     (1) 
  
E = Total Employment  
I = Fixed Investment  
X = Exports 
 
 ∆𝑈𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼2∆𝑋𝑡 + 𝛿(𝑈𝑡−1 − 𝛽1𝐼𝑡−1 − 𝛽2𝑋𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑡                    (2) 
U=unemployment rate 
I = Fixed Investment 
X = Exports 
 
Both the equations (1) and (2) were also estimated distinguishing between public and 
private investments:  
 
∆𝐸𝑡 = 𝛼0, + 𝛼1∆𝑃𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼2∆𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐸𝑡−1 − 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 − 𝛽2𝑃𝑈𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑡      (1.1) 
 
∆𝑈𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝑃𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼2∆𝑃𝑈𝑡 + 𝛿(𝑈𝑡−1 − 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝑡−1 − 𝛽2𝑃𝑈𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑡       (2.1) 
 
PU=Public Fixed Investment  
PR= Private Fixed Investment 
 9 
 
 ∆𝐶𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝑌𝑡 + 𝛼2∆𝐹𝑊𝑡 + 𝛼3∆𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐹𝑆+ 
            +𝛿(𝐶𝑡−1 − 𝛽1𝑌𝑡−1 − 𝛽2𝐹𝐴𝑡−1 − 𝛽3𝑅𝑡−1 − 𝛽4𝐹𝑆𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑡                    (3)                                             
 
C=Final Consumption expenditures of households,  
Y= Gross Disposable Income of households,  
FW=Financial wealth,  
R=Interest rate,  
FS=Fiscal stance (collective consumption/direct+indirect taxes) 
 
Consumption is further estimated, as an OLS, with the following specification: 
 
𝐶𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑊𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑆𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡                     (3.1) 
 
SR=Saving rate 
 
∆𝐼𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝐶𝑡−4 + 𝛼2∆𝑋𝑡 + 𝛼3∆𝑃𝑅𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                             (4) 
  
I=Investment,  
C=Consumption,  
X=Exports,  
PR=Profits 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑈𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                                                                      (5) 
 
CA=Current Account (% GDP) 
U=Unemployment rate 
 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝐶𝑡 + 𝛼2∆𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑡 + 𝛿(𝜋𝑡−1 − 𝛽1𝐶𝑡−1 − 𝛽2𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑡             (6) 
 
 = Inflation (annual - yoy) 
C=Consumption 
OIL=Oil price (€) 
 
Inflation is also estimated with a Seemingly Unrelated Regression for the four 
countries, with the following specification: 
 
𝜋𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝜋𝑡−2 + 𝛼3∆𝐶𝑡,𝑡−4 + 𝛼4∆𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑡,𝑡−1 + 𝛼5∆𝑈𝑡,𝑡−4 + 𝑢𝑡  (6.1) 
 
For all the specifications, we assume that the error terms are 𝑢𝑡 ~ 𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎𝑢
2).  
 
Lags lengths are selected on the basis of the Lag Length Criteria: if the 
cointegration test fails or the sign and size of the elasticities is theoretically incorrect, 
we use different lengths, but closer to the prevailing criteria. Tests for cointegration, 
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heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are carried out. Main estimates, specified 
above, are in the main text, and auxiliary estimates are in the Appendix (Table 7.B). 
      
4. Empirical Results and Policy Implications 
4.1. Policy Implications 
Employment and unemployment are the main economic imbalances of the 
European Union, while investments and exports are the main drivers of lower 
unemployment and higher employment. However, while exports are an exogenous 
variable, the government, indirectly through fiscal policies or directly with higher 
public investments, can promote higher domestic investments. Investments are 
crucial for economic growth because, beyond their impact on unemployment and 
employment, they are carriers of technological innovation. From 2008 to 2013, 
investments declined in Italy and Spain, remained stable in Germany and slightly 
decreased in France. In 2014, the investment growth turned positive in Germany and 
Spain, but remained negative in Italy and France. At the same time, export growth 
was higher in Germany and Spain than in France and Italy, and employment 
responded accordingly, with higher growth in Germany and Spain.   
4.1.1. Employment and the “Investment Gap” 
Full employment can be defined as the level of labour and capital for which the 
economy is on the frontier of its potential production function. To avoid uncertainty 
and shortcomings surrounding the measurement of potential output, we choose to 
take as a reference the pre-crisis level of employment. The relationship between 
employment, investments and exports is measured in terms of elasticities, which can 
easily be translated in terms of the investment multiplier as a measure of “how much 
employment has to be increased to yield an increase in real income sufficient to 
induce [the public] to do the necessary extra saving” (Keynes 1936, 117).  
The VEC estimates for the four countries over the entire period, using the same 
specification, are summarized in Table 1. We can check the results against the 
employment downfall during the crisis: from the peak, at the end of 2007, to the 
trough at the end of 2013, employment fell by 3,6 million in Spain (-17,4%), 1,2 
million in Italy (-5%), and 0.4 million in France (-1%). On the basis of these 
estimates, we can conduct an economic policy exercise. 
In Italy, a 10% investment increase implies a long-term increase of 3% in 
employment (22 million), which corresponds to approximately 660.000 employees; 
therefore, to recover the lost employment of 1,2 million, an increase of +18% would 
be required. The investment required could be less if exports also increase: a 20% 
increase of exports would imply a long-term 2.5% increase of employment (0.126*2), 
i.e., 550.000 jobs. A joint increase of 10% in investments and 20% in exports would 
still make up for the employment loss.  
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Table 1 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Log ( total employment ) = α0 + α1*log(total investment) + α2*log(export)    
Period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN  FRANCE  GERMANY 
Total investment 0,304 0,578 0,296 0,409 
(5,69) (12,98) (6,80) (3,44) 
Export 0,126 0,124   0,182 
(2,69) (2,18)   (6,15) 
C  5,148 2,076 6,766 3,533 
        
Lags  2* 2** 2* 2** 
White Test prob 0,1571 0,0125 0,3976 0,2431 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 41,30 14,70 1,50 21,85 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 35,17 7,44 8,41 26,48 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Cointegration is significant at 5% or less 
** Cointegration is significant between 5% and 10% 
 T – trend added 
The case of Germany is different because employment has steadily increased 
since 2005: employment rose from 36,4 million in 2005 to 39,5 in 2013, with an 
increase of 3,1 million, i.e., +8,7%; real investments rose +13,4% and export volumes 
+38,6% (ESA2010). The contribution of investments to higher employment can be 
estimated as +0,53% (0,409*13,4%), while the contribution of exports to higher 
employment can be estimated as +7% (0,182*38,6%). The joint contribution of 
investments and exports can be estimated as (+0,53) + (+7%) = +7,5%, a figure close 
to the effective value (+8,7%). The estimated decomposition shows that in Germany 
almost all the employment increase can be ascribed to the export increase and, 
presumably, the related expansion of investment capacity.  
The same exercise also shows that between 2008 and 2013, the employment 
decline in Spain, Italy and, to a minor extent, France can be ascribed to the fall of 
investments. 
In the case of Italy, we also performed a more detailed analysis of the direct 
impact on employment, by detailed sectors, of an exogenous increase (+10%) of real 
fixed investments, using the input-output matrix of the Italian economy in the year 
2010, extended to 2013. The results are summarized in Table B.1. 
The input-output simulation for the Italian economy is focused on domestic 
demand, including imports, assuming the structure of exports as exogenous; the 
highest impact on employment is on the construction sector, which accounts for 41% 
of total employment, double the impact of employment in manufacturing. The impact 
on employment of a 10% increase in investments is estimated as 340.000 jobs, 
around half the total impact implied by the previous long-term estimate of 660.000. 
An extended input-output model, with a partly endogenous final consumption, could 
account for a part of the gap (Toffoli, 2015).  
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4.1.2. Unemployment and the “Investment Gap” 
The unemployment rate is a measure of labour market imbalance in the 
European Union, which shows a clear diverging pattern for the four countries during 
the crisis. From 2007 to 2014, the unemployment rate doubled in Italy, tripled in 
Spain, slightly increased in France and sharply fell in Germany. Contrarily, from 
1999 to 2007 the unemployment rates for the four countries were decreasing or stable. 
The whole period from 1999-2013 is, therefore, the union of two distinct sub-periods: 
a period of “normal times” and a period of “exceptional times”, with the 
unemployment rates skyrocketing to 26% in Spain and doubling to 12% in Italy. 
The relationship over the entire period, between the (log of) employment rate 
and the (log of) unemployment rate is non-linear and backward bending in Italy and 
Spain (figure C.1, C.2) and linearly negative in Germany, where, since 2005, the 
unemployment rate has been steadily falling and the employment level rising. 
Contrastingly, there is no clear relationship in France. As a consequence, the 
unemployment-investment and the employment-investment relationships could not 
be specified in the same way. Moreover, the impact of the 2008 crisis was much 
stronger on the unemployment rates, causing a higher instability of the parameters. 
To cope with these problems, and extract some economically informative parameters, 
we chose to run three VEC estimates: one for the entire period (table B.2 in the 
Appendix) and two separately for the subperiods 1999q1-2007q4 and 2008q1-2013q4 
(in the main text). Because the cost of separate estimates is a limited number of 
observations, we kept a parsimonious length structure. We make reference to the pre-
crisis unemployment rate to avoid the remarks raised by the European Commission to 
the NAWRU (2013). 
The main results are the following: a) unemployment rates and investments are 
cointegrated with the correct negative sign for all the countries and b) joint 
cointegration of the unemployment rates with investments and exports holds in Italy, 
but only in “normal times”, and in Germany in both periods, even if the parameters 
are weakly significant because of collinearity.  
On average, the unemployment rate–investments elasticity is between -1 and -2, 
depending on the period and the country. Over the two separate periods, it ranges 
from a low of -0,6/-0,9 in France to a high of -3,6 in Germany, which becomes -2,1 if 
we exclude exports. In Italy, the elasticity is -2,3 while in Spain it is in the range of -
1,5/-1,7. In the case of France, the elasticity increases to -1,3 if we consider the entire 
period (Table 2.a and 2.b). 
Exports could partly replace the “investment gap”, but at the cost of a lower 
potential output. In Italy, the export variable is statistically significant, jointly with 
investment, over the entire period and from 1999q1 to 2007q4. It is significant, but 
with the wrong sign, during the crisis. In Germany, the estimate of a long-term 
relationship between unemployment, investments and exports is fraught with 
problems of collinearity. For the joint estimates of investments and exports in the 
“normal times”, investments are significant, while exports are with the right sign but 
not significant: in the “exceptional times”, both investments and exports are weakly 
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significant. Considering the two variables separately, investments become significant 
in both periods, but exports are not cointegrated or have an implausible elasticity. 
Our VEC specification could not detect exports as a variable jointly cointegrated with 
investments in France and Spain. 
 
Table 2.a 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Log (unemployment rate) = α0 + α1*log(total investment) + α2*log(export)    
Period: 1999q1 2007q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN (1) FRANCE (1) GERMANY GERMANY GERMANY 
Total investment -2,278 -1,712 -0,604 -3,638 -2,116   
  (-5,16) (-2,50) (-4,13)    (-3,45) T    (-7,17) T   
Export -0,790     -0,463   -13,93 
  (-2,82)        (-0,44) T      (-3,54) T 
C  36,667 19,610 8,988 49,487 26,465 167,775 
              
Lags  2** 2* 1* 3* 1* 1 no-coint 
White Test prob 0,0850° 0,5746 0,4675 0,3846 0,2350 0,5870 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 6,91 2,11 2,95 13,41 3,22 7,58 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 6,83 1,94 10,28 19,84 2,84 5,05 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Cointegration is significant at 5% or less. No-coint means that the variable is not cointegrated 
** Cointegration is significant between 5% and 10% 
T : trend added 
 
Table 2.b 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Log (unemployment rate) = α0 + α1*log(total investment) + α2*log(export)    
Period: 2008q1 2013q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN (1) FRANCE (1) GERMANY GERMANY GERMANY 
Total investment -2,287 -1,498 -0,867 -0,336 -0,560   
  (-38,97) (-5,71)    (-4,06) T    (-1,36) T    (-3,84) T   
Export 0,472     -0,207   -6,568 
  (6,52)        (-1,23) T      (-3,55) T 
C  22,129 19,329 11,485 9,295 9,360 82,683 
              
Lags  2* 2* 1* 4* 1* 1* 
White Test prob 0,2205° 0,3488 0,0970 n.a.  0,2716 0,1593 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 10,03 16,19 6,82 8,66 14,46 4,98 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 11,75 9,97 1,39 6,11 1,89 2,88 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Cointegration is significant at 5% or less 
** Cointegration is significant between 5% and 10% 
T : trend added 
The main policy implication is that, relying solely on investments, in Spain and 
Italy it will take a long time to achieve the pre-crisis unemployment rates (from 2007) 
because of the severe investment drops of -37% in Spain and -27% in Italy. Even 
taking exports into account, halving the unemployment rate in Italy would require a 
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long-term investment increase of +10% jointly with an export increase of 25%, which 
could imply an unemployment reduction of (-28%)+(-20%)=(-48%).  
4.1.3. The Role of Public Investments 
 
Public investment is a small share of total fixed investment, which on average 
accounts for 11% in Germany, 14% in Italy, 15% in Spain, and 18% in France (1997-
2013) of total fixed investments. However, public investment can be a crucial 
economic policy instrument in a period of prolonged crisis, when new private 
investments become very prudential and could benefit from an exogenous jump-start. 
To check the impact of public investments on employment and unemployment, we 
disaggregate total investments into public investments—for which Eurostat data are 
available—and private investments, which we measure as the difference between 
total investments and public investments. We use data at current prices, without 
seasonal adjustments, and run a VEC estimate jointly on private and public 
investments. The results regarding employment levels are shown in Table 1.1.  
The main result of these estimates regards Germany, which is the country 
where the employment impact of a public investment program would be the highest 
within the country and, possibly, would spillover on the other European countries.  
 
Table 1.1 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Log( total employment ) = α0 + α1*log(private investment) + α2*log(public investment)        
Period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY  
Private investment 0,235 0,319   0,060 
   (27,01) T    (21,91) T   (0,60) 
Public investment 0,026 0,028 0,171 0,395 
   (5,15) T    (3,29) T (5,65) (5,99) 
C  7,146 6,042 8,488 6,210 
        
Lags 4* 4* 4** 2* 
White Test prob 0,8010° 0,0236° 0,2955° 0,7964 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 8,12 6,26 6,98 54,42 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 13,53 14,77 10,60 36,78 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
 * Cointegration is significant at 5% or less 
** Cointegration is significant between 5% and 10% 
° White Test 1999-2008: Spain 0,5604 
 
In France, the coefficient on public investment is also high, perhaps explaining the 
highest share of public on total investments. In Italy and Spain, the impact of public 
investments on total employment is the lowest, which could imply two policy 
implications: a) public investments are pro-cyclical and should be redressed to the 
goal of stabilizing employment levels and indirectly promoting private investments, 
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and b) private investments are nonetheless more effective and should be promoted, 
sustaining private consumption jointly with fiscal and monetary policies.   
The estimates of the long-term relationship between unemployment and 
investments, public and private, are consistent with our previous results. With one 
exception, all the long-term elasticities of unemployment with respect to private and 
public investment are significant and the elasticities for private investments are 
higher than the elasticities for public investments. Our previously estimated 
elasticities on total unemployment lay in the range -1 to -2: the distinction between 
private and public investment extends the lower bound from -1 to -0.3.  
 
Table 2.1 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Log(unemployment rate) = α0 + α1*log(private investment) + α2*log(public investment)    
Period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Private investment -1,943 -0,747   -1,927 
   (-18,95) T    (-4,19) T   (-7,27) 
Public investment -0,307 -0,065 -0,852 -1,460 
   (-5,14) T    (-0,59) T    (-2,75) T (-11,22) 
C  26,161 10,648 10,016 37,551 
        
Lags  2* 2** 2* 2* 
White Test prob 0,1055 0,2726 0,2149 0,3038 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 15,43 25,78 10,16 71,42 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 10,71 18,86 14,44 15,75 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
 * Cointegration is significant at 5% or less 
** Cointegration is significant between 5% and 10% 
T: trend added 
 
The case of Germany stands again on its own: the elasticity of public investment is 
the highest among the four countries and is not far away from the elasticity of private 
investments in Germany, which in turn have a value close to that of Italy.  
These two sets of estimates lend support to the idea that public investments are 
indeed crucial for economic recovery during this economic slump and, in the form of 
self-financing fiscal policy (Delong and Summers, 2012), could be pivotal in putting 
the economy back on a sustainable growth path (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2013).  
 
4.2. Causes of the European Recession 
The economic policy of fiscal consolidation in Southern European countries 
has been the cause of a sudden decline in households’ disposable incomes through a 
higher fiscal burden and a government spending reduction. Less disposable income 
has brought about a severe consumption slump and a negative shift of consumers’ 
expectations. The underlying question is why households facing a sudden fiscal 
burden increase did not revert to saving to smooth consumption. The sudden 
consumption slump turned into a simultaneous investment drop because firms halted 
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their investment plans for domestic demand. Foreign demand, through increasing 
exports, could not balance the fall of domestic demand and a second recession ensued.   
4.2.1. Consumption Slump and Precautionary Saving  
The dynamics of household consumption is the key to unbundle the chain of 
relationships underlying the second recession, from 2011q1 to 20013q4, and the 
different patterns of recovery since 2014.  
In Germany, household final consumption was always increasing, while in 
France, the rate of growth became negative for 6 quarters, from 2011q4 to 2013q1. In 
Spain and Italy, the consumption downturn was longer. In Spain, household 
consumption became negative for 11 quarters, from 2011q1 to 2013q3, the same 
length as in Italy, which entered the negative zone somewhat later, from 2011q3 to 
2014q1. In Italy, the trough of the consumption slump was in 2012q3 (-4,5%), while 
in Spain, it was in 2013q1 (-3,8%). Spain resumed a positive growth of exports in 
2013q2, two quarters earlier than in Italy; since then, Spanish exports have grown at a 
higher growth rate than those in Italy. The positive relationship between consumption 
and imports, which holds for all four countries, brings back the overlooked constraint 
of the current account balance and the relationship with the unemployment rate, 
which is analysed in section 4.3.1.  
The household private consumption function we estimate is a function of gross 
disposable income, as measured homogenously by Eurostat sector accounts; therefore, 
disposable income for households is the sum of all income sources, namely labour, 
capital interest and dividends, public and private transfers, and the net of direct and 
indirect taxes and social contributions. 
Figure 2 
 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database 
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Consumption can be private or public. General government final consumption 
expenditures can be divided into individual consumption expenditures, which satisfy 
the needs of household members, with some degree of rivalry, such as health, 
education and social protection, and collective consumption expenditures, which 
provide services simultaneously to all the members of the community, without rivalry 
and explicit agreement, such as general public services, defence, and public order 
(Eurostat, 2011, 37). Our focus is on private final consumption: the difference 
between disposable income and saving is an accurate estimate of saving, a “buffer” 
on which to draw to smooth consumption. 
Our estimates are based on the values of gross disposable income and 
individual consumption for the Household Sector (including NPISH) of the European 
Sector Account, and also the National Accounts, when using data for individual and 
collective consumption expenditures of the general government. We use current 
values to allow for comparisons between countries, and between private and public 
consumption; we do not deflate variables because inflation decreases the purchasing 
power of income flows but may also increase the purchasing power of financial 
assets. Moreover, the annual inflation differential with Germany is small in the short 
run. Because the econometric estimates for consumption functions are based on gross 
disposable income, the coefficients are by construction the net addition of current 
income, permanent and transitory, and the yields from financial wealth. Our strategy 
is to estimate the consumption function stepwise: we first estimate a VEC model for 
the basic relationship between consumption and disposable income and then proceed 
to the full model. The long-term relationships, summarized in Table B.3, show 
different elasticities and a marginal propensity to consume between the four 
countries: the average propensity to consume is, however close, which implies a 
different intercept, usually interpreted as a measure of subsistence consumption. 
Because we base our estimates on gross disposable income, we cannot proceed 
to further estimates based on the sources of income, and a distinction between 
permanent and transitory components. We can however propose a meaningful 
comparison with a different set of data from the Bank of Italy, which covers a longer 
and overlapping period, from 1980q1 to 2006q4 in Italy, shortly before the onset of 
the Great Recession. Thus, we extend our basic estimates to include financial wealth 
as well as interest rates. A distinct feature of the Bank of Italy’s estimate is its 
attempt to accommodate two structural breaks, in 1992q3 and 1998q1. Two 
procedures are proposed. The first is a deterministic control in the cointegration 
vector and the second is the inclusion of collective (public) consumption as measure 
of fiscal stance (Bassanetti and Zollino, 2008). In Table 4, we show two estimates of 
the Bank of Italy together with our estimates, tracking their variables as closely as 
possible. Without the adjustment for the structural breaks, the coefficients on 
disposable income estimated by the Bank of Italy have a weaker economic meaning, 
while the inclusion of collective (public) consumption strikingly improves the results 
(column F of Table B.4). 
The comparison of the coefficients over the two overlapping periods (Eurostat 
does not cover housing wealth data) shows similar elasticity coefficients for 
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consumption with respect to disposable income and financial wealth. However, in our 
estimates, the coefficients on bonds and collective consumption have the same 
magnitude, but positive signs (the opposite of the Bank of Italy estimates), meaning 
that a fall in bond yields and collective consumption lowers disposable income. The 
sharp increase of the tax burden and the sovereign debt crisis can explain the different 
signs. 
In 2012q4, the fiscal burden in Italy (direct+indirect taxes/GDP) reached its 
highest level, with a sudden increase of 2 points of GDP with respect to 2011q4 
(figure C. 3). In 2012q4, collective consumption decreased by -7% with respect to 
2011q4 (figure C.4). In our estimates, consumption declines with the decrease of 
collective consumption, which we take as a measure, direct and indirect, of the fiscal 
stance. In 2014, the tax burden, including social contributions, in Italy peaked at 
45.5% of the GDP. 
This argument is consistent with a closer look at the official data. In Italy and 
Spain, collective consumption began to decline (quarterly yoy) in 2012q1 and 
plunged to -10% in Spain and -7% in Italy in 2012q4, while in France and Germany 
collective consumption kept growing. In Italy, total taxation (direct plus indirect) 
kept constantly growing (yoy) from 2011q1 to 2012q4, while in Spain and, to a lesser 
degree, in France, total taxation spiked abruptly in 2012q4. The estimates in Table 3 
are consistent with this empirical evidence. 
Finally, the coefficient on the 10 years Italian bonds is positive and quite significant. 
We interpret the result as a measure of the risk premium on Italian bonds, beyond 
what was already accounted for by the gross disposable income, which allowed a 
direct positive impact on the consumption of the subset of financial investors.  
We extend our estimate of the consumption function to Spain, France and 
Germany, with some adaptations for each country (Table 3), taking into account our 
previous analysis of the empirical evidence on collective consumption and total 
taxation (direct plus indirect).  
In Spain, the high consumption elasticity is related to the housing bubble. From 
1999 to 2007, real household consumption expenditures recorded the highest increase 
in Spain, +34%, followed by France, +20%, Italy, +8%, and Germany, + 5%. In 
Spain, the housing bubble was therefore associated with a consumption spree, 
followed by a retreat when the bubble burst and fiscal burden became tighter. 
Consumption tumbled by -10% between 2007 and 2013. We detect the impact of the 
fiscal stance in Spain with the value of direct and indirect taxes (total taxation), 
which peaked +13% in 2012q4 (yoy). The variable “total taxation” enters the 
regression with the expected negative sign, and decreases direct consumption after 
controlling for gross disposable income. With regard to the yields on 10 years bonds, 
the result is similar to the one for Italy. We chose to regress consumption on the 
German spread to obtain a more significant coefficient and allow a further test of the 
crisis. In 2013, consumption in Spain was still +20% higher than in 1999. 
In France, household consumption increased steadily and regularly, by +22% 
from 1999 to 2013 and by +2% from 2007 to 2013; the elasticities coefficients on 
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disposable income and financial wealth are similar to the consumption function in 
Italy, but French income and consumption paths are on a higher and more stable level.  
In Germany, consumption increased steadily, by +11% over the period 1999-
2013, as did disposable income. The elasticity coefficient on gross disposable income, 
which is 0,941 when income is the only dependent variable, increases significantly to 
1,596 if we include financial variables and collective consumption as a measure of 
fiscal stance. The financial variables, which also have a positive sign, are not 
statistically significant, which is consistent with the fall of financial yields on 
Germany’s bonds. The specification, including financial wealth, is necessary to 
obtain a correct estimate.  
According to Eurostat statistics, Germany recorded an upward trend in the 
household net financial wealth to disposable income ratio, after the Internet bubble of 
2000. The ratio in Germany increased from to 1,47 in 2000—it was 1,12 in 1996—to 
a high of 1,93 in 2013. The German fiscal stance remained more favourable to 
consumption and saving, and the collective consumption expenditures of the general 
government recorded an increase of +22%, from 1999 to 2013. The saving rate 
remained stable, sustained by high social protection benefits.  
A comparison with Table 3.1 improves our understanding of the turning points 
of the crisis and the role of saving as a “buffer”. Germany is the only country where 
no break occurred over the entire period.  
 
Table 3 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Log(Individual consumption) = α0 + α1*log(disposable income) + α2*log(net financial assets)+ 
α3*(interest rate) + α4*log(collective consumption/total taxation) 
Period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Disp. Income 0,644 1,321 0,804 1,596 
(3,46) (12,26) (15,00)    (16,12) T 
Fin. Assets 0,142 0,122 0,159 0,030 
(1,48) (1,48) (4,07)    (0,95) T 
Bonds 10 year   0,052   0,011   
(6,13)   (2,26)   
Collective consumption 0,312     0,114 
(2,93)        (3,47) T 
Spread (Germany)   0,027     
  (9,02)     
Total taxation   -0,239     
  (-2,20)     
Bond 3 months       0,0006 
         (0,71) T 
C  -1,310 -3,081 -0,082 -9,417 
        
Lags 4* 4* 4* 2* 
White Test prob 0,5480 0,4380 0,3351 0,1719 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 33,36 28,09 20,21 64,17 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 41,05 29,55 13,15 29,90 
t-statistics in parenthesis   
T: trend added 
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* Cointegration is significant at 5% or less 
 
4.2.2. The Structural Breaks  
 
This section has a double purpose: to identify structural breaks and test the role 
of saving as a “buffer” during the crisis. To detect the break dates, we use the Bai-
Perron procedure (2003) and then compare the break dates with the economic policy 
of the quarter identified. We use the same variables lagged one period, excluding the 
fiscal stance and including the level of the saving rate; the inclusion of the saving rate 
is motivated by our previous analysis (Campiglio, 2013) as well as the role of 
household saving as a “buffer-stock” (Carroll, 1996). We use OLS because it allows 
the identification of the break dates, according to two possible methods, sequential 
and repartition (Table 3.1). 
 
Table 3.1. 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates 
Log(Individual consumption) = α0 + α1*log(disposable incomet-1) + α2*log(net financial assetst-1)+ 
α3*(interest ratet-1) + α4*log(saving ratet-1)  
Period: 1999q1 2013q4   
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Disp.Incomet-1 0,514 0,833 0,436 0,819 
   (5,90) T (28,01)    (3,93) T (3,67) 
Fin.Assetst-1 0,154 0,222 0,063 0,016 
   (2,92) T (4,51)    (1,09) T (0,16) 
Bonds 10 yeart-1   -0,005 0,001 0,009 -0,007 
   (-1,45) T (0,20)    (1,47) T (-0,99) 
Saving ratet-1 -0,088 -0,014 -0,108 0,017 
   (-5,61) T (-2,53)    (-4,92) T (0,48) 
C  3,780 -1,134 6,133 1,891 
(4,82) (-2,03) (4,38) (1,12) 
Breaks 
Criteria 
sequential / 
repartition 
sequential / 
repartition 
sequential / 
repartition 
sequential / 
repartition 
  2008Q4 2007Q4 2008Q1/2008Q4 no break 
  2011Q3   2010Q4   
White Test prob 0,123 0,338 0,022 0,108 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey pr 0,104 0,476 0,193 0,003 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 1,49 0,59 0,10 2,58 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 18,44 16,17 35,97 49,35 
t-statistic in parenthesis 
T: trend added 
 
    In Italy, we detect two break points: 2008q4—just before the beginning of the 
2009 crisis—and 2011q3, which marked the beginning of a prolonged period of 
recession, currently defined by the NBER as a “significant decline in economic 
activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months”. Italy’s second 
recession complies with this definition, lasting 14 quarters (with the exception of 
2013q3). In the last quarter of 2011, the new government in office approved and 
enacted a law regarding pensions and the labour market. In France, the 2008q1-
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2008q4 break marks the onset of the following 2009 crisis, while 2010q4 marks the 
initial downturn in household final consumption, lasting 6 quarters, from 2011q4 to 
2013q1. In Spain, 2007q4 marks the peak of fixed investments and the turning point 
of the housing bubble, and the two following consumption crisis. The first lasted 7 
quarters, from 2008q3 to 2010q1, and the second 12 quarters, from 2011q1 to 2013q4. 
A further question is why the increasing fiscal burden, which prompted the 
second European crisis, had a severe impact on consumption, missing the smoothing 
coming from household saving. The question has to be split into two: the first is 
whether the saving rate, or its change, has a significant impact on consumption. In the 
affirmative case, the second is why the households did not draw on their savings.  
The estimates of Table 3.1 confirm a negative relationship between the consumption 
level and the lagged level of the saving rate in Italy, Spain and France. In Italy, the 
negative elasticity of -0,09 implies that a 10% decrease in the savings rate level 
prompts a +0,9% increase in the level of consumption. In Germany, the sign is 
positive but not significant. If we substitute the level with the percentage change of 
the savings rate, the coefficients are all significant with negative signs, including in 
Germany (Table B.5). 
Saving has therefore a crucial precautionary role because it can be used as a 
“buffer” to smooth consumption. Its impact on consumption depends, however, on 
the savings (and wealth) distribution. The savings distribution is more concentrated 
than the income distribution, as happens with the wealth distribution. The higher the 
concentration, the lower the share of households with positive precautionary saving; 
however, a lower share of households with positive savings can precipitate a crisis in 
a more severe slump and delay the timing of the recovery. This is clear when lower 
income families are in debt, with negative savings. Carroll (1992) drew due and early 
attention to the lower tail income, pointing to the economic meaning of zero, or near-
zero, incomes as an economic fact rather than a measurement error. 
As Keynes already noted, “unemployment is likely to be associated with 
negative saving (our emphasis) in certain quarters, private or public, because the 
unemployed may be living either on saving of themselves and their friends or on 
public relief which is partly financed out of loans; with the result that re-employment 
will gradually diminish these particular acts of negative saving and reduce, therefore, 
the marginal propensity to consume more rapidly” (Keynes, 136, 121).  
This is the process that has marked the US recovery, with the personal savings 
rate bouncing back to 10.5% in December 2012, and then falling again to 4.9% in 
December 2014. The generalization of this process to the entire economy is what has 
come to be named the deleveraging process, especially with regard to the financial 
sector (Koo, 2008; Eggertsson, Krugman 2013, Wolf 2014).  
   4.2.3. Investment Slump 
The investment function is estimated treating investments as dependent from 
the consumption demand of domestic households, the foreign demand measured by 
the exports and a measure of profits. Figure 1 shows, in the case of Italy, the main 
variables we want to model. Investment increases slowly but steadily until 2007, led 
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by exports and consumption growth, and then from 2008q1 to 2009q1, consumption, 
exports and investments collapse simultaneously. In 2011q1, consumption drops 
again, plunging much more deeply, and the moderate growth of exports cannot 
balance the collapse of consumption, which returned to the level of 1999. The 
simultaneity of the changes between investments and consumption points to a crucial 
asymmetry of the investment process; delaying or halting an investment in progress 
can be immediate, while the decision to start a new investment, risking capital for a 
required rate of return, takes a longer time to materialize. A new investment takes a 
longer time to become operational, while an old investment, or an investment in 
progress, can be stopped immediately.  
The period we estimate underwent a structural change, detected by the breaks 
we measured above, which means that sudden adjustments occurred and the 
economic system of the countries analysed are still in the process of a rapid 
transformation. This is, presumably, the reason why our attempts to find out a long-
term estimate between the variables were inconclusive. The main variable, the year-
on-year rate of change of household final consumption, can also be interpreted as the 
cumulated sum of the monthly rate of change of consumption. In this way, we are 
implicitly assuming a lag for the investment decision. The rates of change of exports 
and (estimated) profits are instead simultaneous, implying a plausible short response 
to an increasing foreign demand and the firms’ financial stability. Our estimates are 
the following (Table 4): 
 
Table 4 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates 
d(log(total investment)) = α0 + α1*d(log(individual consumption)) + α2*d(log(export))+ α3*d(profit)     
Period: 1999q1 2013q4  
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Real consumption (yoy) 0,191 0,313 0,239 0,352 
(3,12) (7,02)    (4,67) T (2,48) 
Real export 0,273 0,193 0,249 0,363 
(4,56) (2,85)    (5,22) T (3,80) 
Profit 0,144 0,007 0,067 0,156 
(1,73) (0,10)    (1,69) T (1,34) 
C  -0,010 -0,022 -0,012 -0,016 
(-3,21) (-6,24)    (-2,82) T (-3,02) 
White Test prob 0,233 0,057 0,168 0,775 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 0,45 0,50 2,86 1,49 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 0,80 1,12 1,15 2,88 
t statistics in parenthesis 
T: trend added 
  
All three variables are significant for all four countries, and their economic 
meaning can be better understood with reference to the ratio of exports/GDP and the 
ratio of household final consumption/GDP (figures C. 5 and C.6 – chain linked). 
Dividing the first ratio with respect to the second, we obtain the ratio 
exports/household final consumption (figure C.7). We discuss the last one because it 
summarizes the other two.  
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From 1999 to 2009, a diverging path prevailed. In Germany, exports jumped 
and the share of domestic consumption declined, while in the other three countries, 
export increases were much lower and the consumption share remained constant, or 
increased only slightly (in France). During the two crises, a “new normal” arose, with 
an increase of exports and a decrease of household consumption share. From 2009 to 
2013, the rates of export increases converged sharply and, with the exception of 
France, the share of household consumption declined (Germany and Spain) or 
remained stable (Italy). Export-led growth in the Euro Zone was widespread from 
Germany to the other countries, and the Euro Zone has become much more export 
oriented.  
 
4.3. Consequences of the European Recession 
4.3.1. The Unemployment-Current Account Trade-Off 
Since the onset of the economic crisis in 2008, the issue of current account 
balance returned to the centre stage, especially for the European economies and their 
economic policy, and it is a closely watched measure of imbalance by the European 
Union (EU 2014). The impressive size of gross capital flows that prompted the 
sovereign debt crisis of Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, Spain and Italy apparently 
overshadowed the role of the current account in favour of the Net International 
Investment Position (NIIP), defined as the difference between the economy’s gross 
foreign assets (A) and its gross foreign liabilities (L). Because it can be shown that 
for most countries, the cumulated current account closely tracks the NIIP, the 
relationship can mask either a current account balance or represent a signal of 
elevated macroeconomic and financial stress, which should warn policy-makers 
about potential stability risks of globalized financial markets (Obstfeld, 2012). The 
sovereign debt crisis has rekindled the debate regarding possible imbalances of 
current account and capital movements within the Euro Zone, whose cross-border 
debits and credits are processed through the Target2 system.  
The Target2 system, originally designed for the purpose of cross-border 
payments, accomplished its role with an almost zero balance until 2007. It has been 
argued, however, that after the onset of the Great European Recession the Target2 
system changed its original role, and became an ECB policy instrument, allowing an 
indirect funding of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Cyprus (GIPSIC). The 
proof would be that the cumulated current account deficits correspond to an equal 
amount of Target2 claims by Germany, Netherlands and Finland (Sinn 2014, 188).  
This argument has been questioned on the ground that Target2 net balances 
cannot be automatically linked to current-account deficits in specific countries and 
cannot be directly capped without putting into question the basic functioning of the 
Euro Zone currency union (Buiter et al., 2011). The currency union argument is 
echoed by an historical comparison between the Euro Zone countries and the US 
regional Reserve Banks between 1913 and 1960. Their relationship was characterized 
by mutual assistance, smoothing the long-term swings of alternative economic 
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fortunes of different states. According to this experience Target2 should be viewed as 
a form of cooperation, deemed essential for the Euro Area (Eichengreen et al., 2014).  
The issue of alternative economic fortunes is crucial. After the German reunification, 
the current account remained negative until the year 2000, while the international 
investment position fell almost to zero. The current account balance bounced back 
positively in 2002 (Figure C.8), immediately after December 2011, when China 
became a member of the WTO. It steadily increased since then, with a corresponding 
growth of the international investment position, reaching a record level of 1.200 
billion at the end of 2013 (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014b). 
The 2013 Annual Report of the Bundesbank points to the non-price factors, 
such as brand preferences, behind the outstanding export success enjoyed by German 
automotive groups, in contrast to the difficulties of the Euro Zone competitors. 
German competitiveness hinges on innovation and an “employment-friendly stance 
for most of the last decade, making it easier for industry to keep and extend high-
quality production stages of the value chain in Germany, despite labour costs, by 
international standards, remaining at high level” (Deutsche Bundesbank, Annual 
Report 2014a, 43). While Hartz reforms of the labour market, in three waves between 
2003 and 2005, helped to improve the efficiency of matching in the labour market 
(Klinger and Roth, 2010), the economic fortunes of Germany turned suddenly 
positive in 2002 with the opportunity to enter the huge new Asian markets “making 
the right stuff at the right time” (The Economist, 2013). 
In the absence of mutual assistance, which can balance alternate countries’ 
fortunes over decades, unemployment arises as a new binding constraint, which 
creates a new trade-off between sustainable unemployment rates and zero balance of 
the current account. 
We estimate the current account (% of GDP) as a function of the 
unemployment rate for Italy, Spain, France and Germany, on the assumption that 
unemployment is a proxy of domestic demand, which includes imports (we do not 
use logarithms because of negative values). Table 5 shows the main values using 
VEC estimates. 
Current account and unemployment are cointegrated and the White test is 
significant, even if at a low level for Spain and France. Indeed, the test is more 
significant when considering the subperiod 1999-2008, before the crisis. In doing so, 
however, we do not include the period 2009-2013, when the current account 
rebalancing occurred. Only if we cover the entire period, 1999-2013, can we estimate 
the level of unemployment corresponding to a zero balance for the current account.  
In the case of Italy, the unemployment rate compatible with a zero current account 
balance is 11%, a magnitude, which bears a close analogy with the current estimates 
for the NAWRU. The snag is that a trade-off between unemployment and current 
account balance arises and, more precisely, with the level of unemployment 
compatible with zero balance of the current account. 
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Table 5  
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Current account= α0 + α1*unemployment rate  
Period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Unemployment Ratet-1 0,517 1,010 0,965 0,956 
(2,92)    (6,90) T    (4,38) T    (8,72) T 
C  -5,561 -11,467 -5,753 -10,463 
        
Lags  4* 4* 4** 4* 
          
Unemployment compatible with zero current account 
Zero Current Account 
Unemployment Rate 
10,756 11,353+0,250*T 5,961+0,102*T 10,944-0,236*T 
        
White Test prob 0,1109° 0,0076° 0,0722° 0,3151° 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 1,69 5,82 4,12 3,01 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 3,44 11,56 1,22 6,19 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Cointegration is significant at 5% or less;  
 ** Cointegration is significant between 5% and 10%                
T: trend added  
White Test 1999-2008: Italy 0,673; Spain 0,706; France 0,736 
 
Within the Euro Area, the level of unemployment compatible with zero 
balance of the current account can stay negative for a long period, as in Germany in 
the 1990s, allowing the economy the time necessary to readjust its structure. In the 
cases of Spain and France, the inclusion of a trend allows us to estimate a lower 
bound of the unemployment rate, which is 11% in Spain and 6% in France. In both 
cases, the positive trend implies a higher level during the recent crisis. In the case of 
Germany, the estimate is instead related to an upper bound, rather than a lower 
bound; the trend coefficient is negative, implying a lower unemployment rate during 
the crisis. The actual total unemployment rates in 2013 were 12.2% in Italy, 26.1% in 
Spain, 10.3% in France and 5.3% in Germany.  
These estimates imply quite different economic policies; while at present 
Germany enjoys a very low level of unemployment, almost the same level is 
reachable in France as a lower bound, improving investments and exports. However, 
in Italy, and even more in Spain, the lower bound of the unemployment rate is 
overestimated or too high. If the unemployment rate is too high, a trade-off between a 
positive current account and a sustainable unemployment rate arises. On the other 
hand, productivity improvements or lower oil prices could lessen the current account 
constraint. 
 
 4.3.2. Inflation gaps and the threshold of nominal price rigidity  
The European crisis is the first experience, since WW II, of a mild deflation 
spreading through many countries and originating from the goods market. Downward 
nominal rigidity admits a temporary degree of flexibility through discounts and price 
policies, while deflation implies downward flexibility of nominal prices, and 
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therefore a backward chain reaction on the prices, especially wages, which form the 
global chain of value. While the issues of inflation and hyperinflation can count on a 
vast theoretical and econometric literature, the same cannot be said about deflation, 
with the exception of Japan, where deflation was anticipated by an initial burst of the 
asset bubble in 1990, and only after the second-half of the 1990s spread to the goods 
market.  
A debated question is whether the inflation slowdown in Europe could 
foreshadow a lasting low inflation or an outright deflation, becoming a cause, jointly 
with a decline in the full-employment interest rate, of a looming “secular stagnation” 
(Summers, 2014). Historical estimates show that forecasting the timing and severity 
of deflation is more difficult than inflation (Burdekin, Siklos, 2004), but, as Bernanke 
put it, “The sources of deflation are not a mystery. Deflation is in almost all cases a 
side effect of a collapse of aggregate demand … likewise the economic effects of a 
deflationary episode, for the most part, are similar to those of any sharp decline in 
aggregate spending, namely, recession, rising unemployment, and financial stress” 
(Bernanke, 2002).  
Since the inception of the Euro Zone in 1999, the rate of annual inflation in 
Spain and Italy has been constantly higher than the rate of inflation in Germany, with 
the exception of 2013. Between 2013 and 1999, the inflation gap with respect to 
Germany accumulated a divergence of 20 points in Spain, 11 points in Italy, and only 
a minimal gap of 3 points in France. Given the initial parity conversion to the euro in 
1999, the loss of price competitiveness accumulated so far would require, lacking the 
adjustment through devaluation, a corresponding negative inflation gap, or internal 
devaluation, with respect to Germany. 
 
Figure 3  
 
Source: our calculations on Eurostat  
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Over the last two years, the inflation gap has been partially filled by internal 
devaluation and a mild deflation. We can measure how the gap has been reduced by 
looking to the quarter when the inflation rates began to be lower than the ones in 
Germany. The relevant dates are 2012q4 in France, 2013q2 in Italy and 2013q3 in 
Spain. Comparing the inflation rates in Germany and each country over the 
corresponding periods, we can estimate a devaluation of -1% in France, -2,2% in 
Spain and -2,8% in Italy. Should this trend continue for at least two years, the 
adjustment would be almost complete; the problem is that, as the EU officially 
acknowledges, “slow growth and low inflation weigh on the reduction of imbalances 
and macroeconomic risk” (EU 2014, 2).  
The crisis, prompted by fiscal austerity measures and the falling internal 
demand for consumption and investments, dragged on a downside comovement of 
the inflation rates, well below the 2% inflation target of the ECB. The sequence of 
the downside turning points of inflation (yoy monthly) was the following: October 
2011 in Germany, December 2011 in France, March 2012 in Italy, and October 2012 
in Spain. Outright deflation appeared for the first time in Spain in March 2014, in 
Italy in August 2014, and in France and Germany in January 2015. The growing 
threat of a European deflation prompted the European Central Bank to announce a 
package of non-standard monetary measure in March 2015, with the aim of fostering 
a wider economic recovery and gradually increasing inflation rates. 
 
Table 6 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates (SA) 
Inflationt= α0 + α1*d(log(individual consumption)) + α2*d(log(oil price))    
Period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE  
Real consumption (yoy) 0,114 0,138 0,131 
(2,55) (8,40) (3,42) 
Oil Price (€) 0,978 5,543 4,325 
(0,43) (3,68) (2,53) 
C  1,809 1,785 1,217 
      
Lags  4* 2* 4* 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
   * Cointegration is significant at 5% or less 
   
To analyse the inflation dynamics, we need to focus on the imbalances of the 
goods market, the oil market—whose price dynamics are crucial for the European 
economy—and the labour market. A VEC estimate of the rates of change allows us to 
measure the long-term impact of the rates of change of domestic consumption and the 
price in euros of oil. The real growth rate of consumption is obtained by deflating the 
nominal rate with a seasonal price index (SA). We could not obtain similar results for 
Germany. The estimates are shown in Table 6. 
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The two variables, real growth of domestic consumption and growth of oil prices, are 
both significant for Spain and France; the coefficient on oil is significant in Spain and 
France (but not in Italy), where, however, its magnitude is much higher than the one 
for real consumption. 
The long-term estimates raise the following question: how much of a 
percentage decline in household real consumption is theoretically required to force a 
zero rate of inflation? This percentage is the threshold of the consumption drop, 
which can force a break to the downward nominal price rigidity. Between 2007 and 
2013, real consumption decreased in Spain by -10% and in Italy by -8%. The 
theoretical fall of consumption, which would have implied a zero rate of inflation, is 
higher and can be estimated as -13% in Spain and -16% in Italy. Spain is the country 
with the lowest gap between theoretical and effective declines, while in Italy the 
effective consumption decline is half the theoretical estimate. The estimate for France 
has a marginal economic meaning because real consumption increased in the period. 
However, some caveats are in order. If we split the entire period to before and 
after 2007, the coefficients become more unstable and volatile, increasing their 
magnitude substantially after 2007.  
Inflation dynamics in the four countries show a close comovement, as the dates 
of the inflation turning point suggest; therefore, we choose to add a Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression to the VEC estimate, whose specification and estimates are 
shown in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1 
 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates 
Inflationt= α0 + α1inflationt-1 + α2 inflationt-2 + α3*d(log(individual consumption)) +  
α4*d(log(oil price)) + α5*d(log(unemployment rate))      
Period: 1999q1 2013q4  
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Inflationt-1  0,783 0,836 0,867 0,819 
(8,18) (8,86) (10,50) (8,14) 
Inflationt-2 -0,026 -0,200 -0,231 -0,114 
(-0,26) (-2,46) (-3,06) (-1,24) 
Real consumption (yoy SA) 0,070 0,067 0,059 0,063 
(4,25) (4,59) (3,76) (2,37) 
Oil Price (€) 0,829 1,865 1,293 1,407 
(2,19) (3,43) (3,77) (4,26) 
Unemployment (yoy) .. .. .. -0,843 
      (-1,95) 
C  0,185 0,472 0,353 0,210 
(1,06) (2,62) (2,94) (1,52) 
Drop in consumption 
implied by zero inflation -13,5 -16,5 -16,8 -14,5 
t statistics in parenthesis 
.. not significant at 10% 
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The OLS estimates for each single country identify a common break in 2007q4 
in Italy and Spain, which can be associated with the onset of the first crisis, and 
another in France in 2004q4, for which we do not have an economic explanation. 
Germany does not show any break (Table B.6).  
The break of the 2008 crisis impinges on the size of the elasticity coefficients, 
as the previous break test suggests, at least in the cases of Italy and Spain; therefore, a 
separate estimate of the “normal” period (1999-2008) from the “exceptional” period 
(2008-2013) becomes necessary. The results, with a SUR estimate, are the following 
(Table 7): 
 
Table 7 
Elasticity-Threshold           ITALY          SPAIN         FRANCE  GERMANY 
                                               Elasticity of inflation to consumption 
 1999q1-2013q4       0,070         0,067          0,059      0,063 
 1999q1-2007q4       0,081            0,079          0,082      0,036 
 2008q1-2013q4       0,164          0,070          0,126      0,179 
                                                Consumption drop for a zero inflation 
 1999q1-2013q4       - 13,5%       -16,5%        -16,8%        -14,5% 
 1999q1-2007q4        -13,3%        -14,1%        -   9,7%        -27,3% 
 2008q1-2013q4        -  4,6%        -16,0%        -   7,4%        -  2,7% 
                                 Effective consumption drop/increase 2008q1-2013q4 
2008q1-2013q4  (1)          -7,5%         -12,0%           + 2,3%         +4,5% 
2008q1-2013q4  (2)          -7,8%          -10,2%           + 2,0%          +5,2% 
(1) ESA2010, (2) ESA05  
 
The elasticities of inflation to consumption are significantly different between 
the two periods. In “exceptional times” of crisis, the elasticities are higher than in the 
“normal” times for all the countries. Therefore, the average estimates mask a non-
linearity, which surfaces splitting the two periods. Regarding the threshold measure, 
as the implied consumption drop, we can check that the ex-post consumption drop 
exceeds the threshold in the case of Italy. In the case of Spain, which exhibits a sharp 
rise and fall of consumption (figure 2), the high threshold is below but close to the 
ex-post consumption drop. In principle, the issue should not be a problem for France 
and Germany; however, as shown in Figure 3, these countries are also at risk of low 
inflation or mild deflation. The gap between ex-post inflation and thresholds can be 
explained as a process of contagion inside the Euro Zone.  
The same exercise can be carried out on the coefficients of oil price changes, 
which measure the ratio (% change inflation rate/% oil price in euros), i.e., the 
elasticity of inflation with respect to a given oil price change, ranging from a low of 
0,829 in Italy to a high of 1,865 in Spain. In addition, a problem with the instability 
of the coefficient arises with these estimates because of the economic crisis and also 
as a consequence of the wide swings in oil prices, which ranged from a peak of 
120$ in March 2012 to a trough of 50$ at the beginning of 2015. Should the low oil 
prices stabilize, then the benefits, such as lower unemployment rates compatible with 
zero current account, will have to be weighted with a radical restructuring of world 
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demand and supply between OPEC countries and Western countries plus China. In 
the process, deflation would set in. We do not know enough about how the Euro 
Zone could bear a mild deflation and the possible contagion between the member 
countries; indeed, going back to “normal” inflation seems the safer option.  
One final remark on the relationship between inflation and the unemployment 
rate: Germany is the only country where the negative relationship holds and is 
significant. The estimate on the entire period breaks down if we split the period 
before and after the period, and the relationship is very significant only before the 
economic crisis, from 1999q1 to 2007q4, (it changes sign from 2008q1 to 2013q4). 
A higher indirect tax burden also influenced inflation and consumption. Higher 
indirect taxes directly depress domestic consumption when they are fully passed on in 
higher prices and indirectly depress domestic consumption when they are only partly 
passed on because higher indirect taxes depress domestic demand through lower real 
disposable income or lower profits. Even in the latter case, the tax effect measured by 
the former hypothesis is a significant approximation of its lowering impact on 
consumption (Figure C.9)  
If we make the hypothesis that higher indirect taxes were implemented and 
fully passed on to inflation, the cumulated impact on the period 2011q1 to 2014q3 
added 2,2 points of inflation in Spain, 1,6 points in Italy and 0,9 in France, while the 
impact on Germany’s inflation was zero. The order of inflation turning points, as 
noted above, is the exactly the reverse: Germany, France, Italy and Spain. 
Alternatively, if we deduce the tax effect, inflation in Spain has hovered around zero 
since April 2013 and in Italy since March 2014. The implication would seem to be 
that the deflation pressure and contagion, originating from the decreased demand in 
the goods market, originated earlier than the official measures signalled, with a delay 
masked by the increase of indirect taxes.  
The ECB single mandate for its monetary policy has exacerbated downward 
deflation pressures in spite of its acknowledgement that “not only inflation above 2% 
but also deflation, i.e., a self-sustaining fall in the broad price index, is inconsistent 
with price stability”, and that, “it is more difficult for monetary policy to fight 
deflation than to fight inflation” … “monetary policy may not be able to provide a 
sufficient degree of support to the economy by using its interest instrument” (The 
Monetary policy of the ECB 2011, 66). Non-standard monetary measures adopted in 
March 2015 confirm what was anticipated by the ECB. The Federal Reserve 
monetary, with its double mandate of price stability and employment, as stated in 
1977 (Public Law, 1977), has a wider space for policy action, which is still needed 
because the shadows of low inflation are still present. 
 
4.3.3. Germany’s exports model 
Germany’s exports model is often proposed as a solution to the sluggish 
growth of the European countries. Germany’s success in foreign markets, and the 
related boom of its current account balance, is officially claimed as an imbalance to 
be corrected. The Alert Mechanism Report 2015 has warned against the increasing 
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current account balance because it is “driven mainly by a reduction in exports to the 
rest of the euro area, rather than an increase in imports by Germany … [and because 
it is] the result of low domestic demand, including investments, as well as strong 
competitiveness” (EU 2014; 7,21). As a consequence, a pattern of divergent growth 
has resurfaced among the European countries. From 2010 to 2013, economic growth 
outside the Euro Zone was positive, or non-negative, in the U.K., Poland, Sweden, 
Romania, Latvia (joining Euro in 2014), Bulgaria, and Lithuania, and inside the Euro 
Zone in Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Estonia, Malta and France. The countries where 
real GDP declined were Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic. 
The pattern described for the EU countries can be summarized, over the period 
2000-2013, by a positive relationship between GDP and exports changes (Figure 
C.11). A closer look at this relationship shows that, with the exception of Ireland and 
the Czech Republic, all the countries with a positive economic performance through 
the crisis also had a strong economic relationship with Germany. In fact, according to 
our estimates, the shares of exports to Germany to total exports (intra and extra UE), 
over the period 2008-2013, in Czech Republic averaged 32%, in Austria 31%, in The 
Netherlands and Poland 26%, in Hungary 25%, in Luxembourg 21%, in Slovakia 
20%, in Belgium and Romania 18%, in France 16% and in Italy and Portugal 13% 
(Table 8). 
Germany’s border countries form a cluster, which fully qualify with the goal of 
reindustrialization proposed in the European Competitiveness Report (2014, 22), 
quantified with a target of 20% of industry over the total gross value added for the 
EU countries. In 2013, the only European countries where the manufacturing shares 
were above the 20% threshold were Germany, the Czech Republic, Romania, Ireland, 
Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Lithuania. Germany is obviously at the centre of 
this cluster. Therefore, a shock to Germany’s exports has a bigger impact, positive or 
negative, primarily on border countries, which dies away as the European countries 
are geographically farther apart. Spain is an exception because its exports of goods to 
Germany increased substantially, more than the corresponding increase of exports 
from Italy and France.  
In 1999, Germany’s current account balance, as a share of GDP, was still 
slightly negative. It became positive in 2002 and jumped to 7,5% in 2013; 
simultaneously, the export/GDP ratio almost doubled, from 26% in 1999 to 47% in 
2014 (ESA2010). In Japan, an economy of bigger but comparable size, the 
corresponding ratio increased from 11% in 2000 to 16% in 2013, while in the US it 
was 14%. Korea is the only comparable country with a similar pattern of exports, 
booming to 54% in 2013 (Figure C.10).  
The extraordinary export, performance of Germany can be partly explained if we 
consider only the flow of exports going outside the EU (we use data ESA05). From 
1999 to 2013 the 20-point increase in the export/GDP ratio was equally shared 
between the EU countries and extra-EU countries. If we consider the EU as a single 
economic entity, the export/GDP ratio of Germany in 2013 becomes 20%, a level still 
higher than in Japan and the US, but within a more reasonable range. 
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Table 8 
Ranking of countries by German share of total exports of goods 
Country 
Share of total 
exports to Germany 
Δ% of exports to 
Germany 2008-2013 
Czech Republic 31,7 25,5 
Austria 30,5 7,5 
The Netherlands 25,7 15,2 
Poland 25,6 33,4 
Hungary 25,4 7,7 
Luxembourg 21,3 -16,3 
Slovakia 20 42,1 
Belgium 18,3 -5,8 
Romania  18,2 66,3 
France 16,1 7,8 
Italy 12,7 2,9 
Portugal 12,7 11,1 
Bulgaria 10,9 98,4 
Spain 10,6 20,9 
Sweden 10 -2 
UK 9,9 -2 
Lithuania 8,5 53 
Estonia 5 29,8 
N.B. The share of total export value to Germany is averaged from 2008-
2013.   
Our calculation on Eurostat data on international trade HS2-HS4 [DS-016894] 
 
If we select the period 2007-2013, however, the result is quite different. The 
export/GDP ratio of Germany increases by 3,5 points, with a decrease of 1 point 
inside the EU area and a further increase of 4,5 to extra-EU countries (as argued by 
the Alert Report 2015). Germany escaped the Great European Recession thanks to 
the Asian and the US markets, together with the European countries whose trades are 
more closely connected to Germany (Table 8). In the case of Spain, data allow us to 
split the increase only for the period 2007-2011 (which is the period shown in Table 
9). However, for the entire aggregate we have data available up to 2013 showing an 
increase in the export/GDP ratio of 7,4 points in the period 1999-2013, implying a 
further acceleration of exports in 2012-2013. In fact, this is what aggregate data for 
Spain’s exports confirm, while the previous analysis suggested that exports to 
Germany were a major driver. 
The unfavourable consequence of this process is a slowdown of economic 
convergence with the other major countries, such as France, Spain and Italy, 
hampering the process towards an effective currency area. Exports improvement, 
such as for Spain, seems promising, with a volume growth of +15% from 2010 to 
2013, which is higher than in Germany (+12%), France or Italy (+9%). Moreover, 
between 2007 and 2013 Spain’s exports were the most dynamic, and the ratio of 
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export/GDP increased by 7,2 points. However, the positive performance of the 
exports was not enough to balance the slump in household consumption; as a 
consequence, the GDP fell in 2012 and 2013. 
 
Table 9 
Country 
Exports of goods and services - % GDP of each country 
Total To EU countries Extra-EU 
1999 2007 2013 1999 2007 2013 1999 2007 2013 
Germany 29,4 47,2 50,7 18,7 29,8 28,8 10,7 17,4 21,9 
Spain (2011)  26,7 26,9 30,8 19,5 19,5 20,9 7,1 7,4 9,9 
France 26,3 26,9 27,2 16,6 16,9 15,8 9,7 10,0 11,4 
Italy 24,3 28,9 30,4 14,9 17,4 16,1 9,4 11,5 14,3 
  2013-1999 2013-1999 2013-1999 
Germany 21,3 10,1 11,2 
Spain (2011)  4,1 1,4 2,8 
France 0,9 -0,8 1,7 
Italy 6,1 1,2 4,9 
  2013--2007 2013-2007 2013-2007 
Germany 3,5 -1,0 4,5 
Spain (2011)  3,9 1,4 2,5 
France 0,3 -1,1 1,4 
Italy 1,5 -1,3 2,8 
N.B Our calculations on Eurostat data (ESA05): Spain until 2011.  
As we show (Figure C.11), a positive relationship holds between GDP and export 
changes for a cross-section of the EU countries from 2000 to 2013. A similar 
correlation holds, over the same period, between the changes in final consumption 
and exports for the EU. These results are especially relevant for the countries in the 
first quadrant, (positive changes of consumption and exports), which include 
Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Austria, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, while for Germany’s other partners, such as the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Hungary, only a slight decrease in consumption occurred.  
We explain the positive increase of consumption for these countries with the spillover 
of the high added value of Germany in the value chain of its exports. As in the 
Balassa-Samuelson model, the most profitable industries will trickle down as higher 
wages and profits to the entire economic area involved.  
 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to unbundle the unbalanced Great European 
Recession, which halted the process of economic convergence and divided European 
countries. We selected the following set of economic imbalances: employment, 
unemployment, consumption, investment, current account, and inflation, of which 
only two—unemployment and current account balance—are included in the 11 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure Scoreboard. For each imbalance, we estimated 
a regression on quarterly data, from 1999q1 to 2013q4, for Germany, France, Spain 
and Italy, which account for almost 80% of the Euro Zone GDP.  
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Our estimates confirm the chain of causation we posit, from the consumption 
slump—caused by the fiscal policy—to the investment drop and to the main 
consequences, identified with increasing unemployment, decreasing employment, 
falling inflation, current account improvement due to increasing unemployment in 
Italy and Spain.  
The estimates show that the first crisis, in 2008, and the second crisis, in 2012-
2013, caused structural breaks. Italy and Spain went through a prolonged economic 
crisis of 7 years, which changed the main economic relationship and returned 
economic activity to the past. In 2014, the real GDP in Italy returned to 1999 levels, 
while in Spain, which reported positive growth in 2014, the real GDP is still at the 
2005 level. 
We put the imbalances of unemployment and employment, for which we 
estimate a significant relationship with investments and exports, at the centre of our 
analysis. Exports are a crucial driver, in the short run, for lower unemployment and 
higher employment. However, exports are exogenous, and it is crucial to implement a 
public investment program with the purpose of promoting private investments and 
employment to jump start the chain reaction of increasing disposable income and 
consumption.  
Investments create employment and are carriers of technological innovation, 
productivity and a better standard of living. Therefore, filling the “investment gap” 
should be the fundamental goal of the European economy. 
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Table A.1                                              Stylized Facts 
Individual Consumption 
period: 1999q1 2013q4 - 60 observations  
            Billions Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum 
ITALY 231,5 23,4 164,2 245,6 
SPAIN 133,7 21,9 89,1 163,5 
FRANCE 250,4 34,4 185,7 303,1 
GERMANY 336,7 31,9 278,7 406,6 
     Total Investment 
period: 1999q1 2013q4 - 60 observations 
            Billions Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum 
ITALY 70,3 6,0 57,8 79,6 
SPAIN 58,5 8,9 45,6 75,8 
FRANCE 82,8 6,6 68,1 94,8 
GERMANY 103,0 5,6 93,4 112,4 
     Total Employment - 60 observations 
period: 1999q1 2013q4  
            Millions Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum 
ITALY 22,0 0,7 20,0 23,1 
SPAIN 17,8 1,7 14,2 20,6 
FRANCE 24,7 0,9 22,4 25,9 
GERMANY 37,0 1,4 35 39,7 
     Total Export 
period: 1999q1 2013q4- 60 obervations  
            Billions Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum 
ITALY 93,7 9,3 74,0 109,4 
SPAIN 60,5 9,0 43,1 78,1 
FRANCE 113,7 11,0 87,2 132,6 
GERMANY 243,4 57,7 139,4 334,4 
     Unemployment rate 
period: 1999q1 2013q4 - 60 obervations  
             Rates Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum 
ITALY 8,6 1,6 5,9 12,5 
SPAIN 14,4 5,8 8,0 26,3 
FRANCE 8,9 0,8 7,1 10,8 
GERMANY 8,1 1,7 5,2 11,4 
     Current Account 
period: 1999q1 2013q4 - 60 obervations 
           % GDP Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum 
ITALY -0,9 1,7 -5,9 2,6 
SPAIN -4,8 3,1 -11,8 1,8 
FRANCE -0,1 1,6 -3,3 3,7 
GERMANY 4,3 3,3 -3,3 9,0 
     Inflation 
period: 1999q1 2013q4 -  60 obervations  
              Rates  Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum 
ITALY 2,2 0,7 0,1 4,0 
SPAIN 2,7 1,1 -0,9 4,9 
FRANCE 1,7 0,8 -0,4 3,7 
GERMANY 1,6 0,7 -0,4 3,2 
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Table A.2. 
 
Improving and Losing Countries (2013-2010) 
 
        GDP - volumes 
2013-2010 
Δ% 
2013/2010   2010 2011 2012 2013 
Italy 1.418.376 1.424.752 1.391.018 1.365.227 -53.149 -3,7 
Greece 193.754 179.986 167.436 160.981 -32.772 -16,9 
Spain 948.244 948.721 933.148 921.739 -26.505 -2,8 
Portugal 158.544 156.561 151.504 149.374 -9.170 -5,8 
Netherlands 549.265 554.453 547.538 543.033 -6.232 -1,1 
Croatia 36.875 36.788 35.982 35.654 -1.221 -3,3 
Cyprus 15.327 15.394 15.023 14.210 -1.117 -7,3 
Slovenia 31.347 31.569 30.767 30.426 -921 -2,9 
Czech Rep. 119.442 121.614 120.372 119.248 -194 -0,2 
LOSING 3.471.173 3.469.839 3.392.788 3.339.891 -131.281 -3,8 
  GDP - volumes 
2013-2010 
Δ% 
2013/2010   2010 2011 2012 2013 
Malta 5.542 5.619 5.680 5.843 302 5,4 
Finland 164.164 168.802 167.100 164.795 631 0,4 
Hungary 87.760 89.138 87.655 88.618 859 1,0 
Bulgaria 26.570 27.059 27.218 27.452 882 3,3 
Luxembourg 32.725 33.348 33.289 34.001 1.276 3,9 
Estonia 11.258 12.234 12.786 13.073 1.815 16,1 
Latvia 12.463 13.125 13.809 14.377 1.914 15,4 
Denmark 206.676 208.891 208.141 209.009 2.333 1,1 
Slovakia 48.372 49.815 50.712 51.189 2.818 5,8 
Lithuania 22.099 23.436 24.293 25.103 3.004 13,6 
Ireland 163.483 167.029 167.291 166.723 3.240 2,0 
Belgium 321.956 327.604 327.133 327.776 5.820 1,8 
Romania 90.735 92.848 93.364 96.655 5.921 6,5 
Austria 261.782 269.201 271.545 272.411 10.629 4,1 
Sweden 323.348 332.830 335.919 341.419 18.072 5,6 
Poland 307.696 321.607 328.018 333.111 25.415 8,3 
France 1.772.645 1.808.575 1.808.826 1.812.687 40.042 2,3 
U.K. 1.898.237 1.919.448 1.924.779 1.958.337 60.100 3,2 
Germany 2.375.659 2.454.848 2.471.753 2.482.430 106.771 4,5 
IMPROVING 8.133.169 8.325.454 8.359.312 8.425.011 291.842 3,6 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database 
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Table B.1 
Employment impact of 10% increase of fixed investment on domestic demand (Italy-2013) 
Nace Sectors Employment % total 
A Agricolture, hunting and forestry 3.361 1,0 
B Fishing 54 0,0 
C Mining and quarrying 541 0,2 
D Manufacturing 68.116 19,9 
E Electricity, gas and water supply 1.929 0,6 
F Construction 141.263 41,3 
G Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor 42.713 12,5 
H Hotel and restaurants 4.500 1,3 
I Transport, storage and communication 28.223 8,2 
J Financial intermediation 6.081 1,8 
K Real estate, renting and business activity 39.640 11,6 
L Public Administration 188 0,1 
M Education 1.380 0,4 
N Heatlth and social work 146 0,0 
O Other community, social and personal services 3.738 1,1 
P Private Households 567 0,2 
Q Extra-territorial services 1 0,0 
  
342.442 100,0 
Source: calculation by Lorenzo Toffoli on input-output table 2010 
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Table B.2 
 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
log( unemployment rate) = α0 + α1*log(total investment) + α2*log(export)    
period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN (1) FRANCE (1) GERMANY 
Total investment 
-2,539 -1,181 -1,330 -8,316 
(-9,39) (-3,03)    (-4,22) T (-4,07) 
Export -0,240     -1,311 
(-1,04)     (-3,53) 
C  33,237 15,551 -17,051 114,296 
        
Lags  2* 2* 1* 1** 
White Test prob 0,0021 0,000 0,1945 0,0842 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 6,07 0,29 3,19 5,19 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 15,65 6,50 9,21 6,36 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
 * Cointegration is significant at 5% or less 
** Cointegration is significant between 5% and 10% 
T: trend added 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.3 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
log(Individual consumption) = α0 + α1*log(disposable income)  
period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Disp.Income 0,684 1,078 0,966 0,941 
(4,95) (34,55) (78,25) (87,98) 
C  3,768 -1,065 0,255 0,577 
        
apc 0,853 0,879 0,848 0,837 
mpc 0,58 0,95 0,82 0,79 
Lags 2* 2* 2* 2* 
White Test prob 0,2252 0,0272 0,7486 0,1552 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 34,93 20,24 25,07 122,19 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 19,99 15,40 15,04 54,86 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
 * Cointegration is significant at 5% or less 
** Cointegration is significant between 5% and 10% 
T: trend added 
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Table B.4 
                    Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Italy 
log(Individual consumption) = α0 + α1*log(disposable income) + α2*log(net financial 
assets)+ α3*bonds10years + α4*log(collective consumption) 
Cointegrated equation 
Variable BdI BdI Estimate 
Table 2 (F) Table II-1 (D) 2013 
Housing wealth 0,047 0,064   
(3,879) (5,601)   
Financial wealth/ non housing wealth 0,191 0,244 0,142 
(8,463) (10,974) (1,486) 
Disposable income 0,755 0,444 0,664 
(9,008) (10,930) (3,461) 
Bonds10/ interest rate -0,045 -0,019 0,052 
(-6,162) (-3,024) (6,131) 
Collective consumption -0,191   0,312 
(-4,181)   (2,939) 
Banca d'Italia, "Household wealth in Italy", A. Bassanetti and F. Zollino, 2007 
 
Table B.5 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates 
log(Individual consumption) = α0 + α1*log(disposable incomet-1) + α2*log(net financial assetst-
1)+ α3*(interest ratet-1) + α4*d(log(saving ratet-1))  
period: 1999q1 2013q4   
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Disp.Incomet-1 0,507 0,816 0,507 0,758 
   (7,61) T (35,63)    (6,97) T (3,48) 
Fin.Assetst-1 0,128 0,246 0,130 0,036 
   (2,72) T (6,64)    (3,15) T (0,40) 
Bonds 10 yearst-1   0,0003 0,006 0,005 -0,008 
   (0,10) T (1,25)    (1,03) T (-1,18) 
Δ% Saving ratet-1 -0,049 -0,016 -0,091 -0,052 
   (-7,64) T (-6,14)    (-9,39) T (-2,38) 
C  3,967 -1,302 4,029 2,435 
(5,85) (-3,01) (3,82) (1,43) 
Break 
criteria 
sequential / 
repartition 
sequential / 
repartition 
sequential / 
repartition 
sequential / 
repartition 
  2010Q3/2007Q2 2007Q4 2008Q4 no break 
  2007Q2/2010Q2       
White Test prob 0,025 0,792 0,007 0,004 
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey prob 0,013 0,914 0,055 0,905 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 0,87 0,00 0,07 28,59 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 12,85 4,49 13,93 42,55 
t statistic in parenthesis 
T: time trend 
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Table B.6 
Inflationt= α0 + α1inflationt-1 + α2 inflationt-2 + α3*d(log(individual consumption)) +  α4*d(log(oil price)) + 
α5*d(log(unemployment rate))      
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates 
period: 1999q1 2013q4  
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Inflationt-1  0,884 0,879 0,909 0,742 
(6,72) (7,12) (7,80) (6,14) 
Inflationt-2 -0,063 -0,246 -0,225 -0,016 
(-0,47) (-2,35) (-2,18) (-0,15) 
Real consumption 
(yoy) 
0,077 0,076 0,081 0,107 
(3,63) (3,97) (3,69) (3,16) 
Oil Price (€) 0,973 1,899 1,355 1,441 
(2,34) (3,14) (3,57) (4,05) 
Unemployment (yoy) .. .. .. -0,765 
      (-1,40) 
C  0,013 0,451 0,171 0,030 
(0,06) (2,07) (1,13) (0,18) 
White Test prob 0,908 0,322 0,028 0,524 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 0,305 0,955 0,739 0,019 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 3,545 0,529 0,904 0,582 
Break 
criteria 
sequential / 
repartition 
sequential / 
repartition 
sequential / 
repartition 
sequential / repartition 
  2007Q4 2007Q4 2004Q4 no break 
White Test prob 0,680 0,890 0,680 0,524 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 0,867 1,098 0,397 0,019 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 3,047 1,269 0,249 0,582 
t statistic in parenthesis 
T: a time trend is added for stationarity 
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 Figure C.1 
 
Source: calculations by Maurizio Baussola 
 
 Figure C.2 
 
Source: calculations by Maurizio Baussola 
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Figure C. 3 
 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database  
 
Figure C. 4 
 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database  
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Figure C.5 
 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database  
 
 
Figure C.6 
 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database  
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Figure C.7 
 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database  
 
Figure C.8 
 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database  
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Figure C.9 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database. Tax covered are: VAT, other consumption taxes, car 
registration, insurance premiums, other taxes on hotels and restaurants 
 
 
Figure C. 10 
 
Source:  Source: our calculation on  World Bank database 
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Figure C.11 
 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database  
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LEGEND 
    
Inflation                                        
(infl) 
Quarterly (three months average) data, annual rate of change (yoy) 
Eurostat, Extracted 01.07.14 
Private Consumption                     
(cind) 
Individual Consumption Expenditures (millions euro), Households, 
European Sector Accounts, Quarterly data, Not seasonally adjusted, 
Eurostat, Extracted 07.14  
Oil Price 
Crude Oil Prices: Brent-Europe, Euro per barrel, Not seasonally 
adjusted, Fred St. Louis, Extracted 10.09.14 
Unemployment Rate                                 
(un) 
Unemployment Rate by sex and age groups, Quarterly average, %, 
Seasonally adjusted data, Eurostat, Extracted 07.14 
Savings Rate      
(savrat) 
Saving Rate in %, Households, European Sector Accounts, Quarterly 
data, Not seasonally adjusted, Eurostat, Extracted 07.14 
Total Investment (SA) 
  (invtot) 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation by 6 asset type, Volumes, Total fixed 
assets, Million Euro, chain-linked volumes reference year 2005, 
Seasonally adjusted and adjusted data by working days, Quarterly 
data, Eurostat, Extracted 05.09.14 
Construction Investment                                
(ctr) 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation by 6 asset type, Volumes, Dwellings + 
Other buildings and structures, Million Euro, chain-linked volumes 
reference year 2005, Seasonally adjusted and adjusted data by 
working days, Quarterly data, Eurostat, Extracted 05.09.14 
Industrial Investment                  
(ind) 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation by 6 asset type, Volumes, Total fixed 
assets - construction investment, Million Euro, chain-linked volumes 
reference year 2005, Seasonally adjusted and adjusted data by 
working days, Quarterly data, Eurostat, Extracted 05.09.14 
Export                       
  (ex) 
GDP and main components, Volumes, Exports of goods and services, 
Million Euro, chain-linked volumes reference year 2005, Seasonally 
adjusted and adjusted data by working days, Quarterly data, 
Eurostat, Extracted 08.09.14 
Total Investment (NOT SA)                                               
(invtns) 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation by 6 asset type, Volumes, Total fixed 
assets, Million Euro, chain-linked volumes reference year 2005, Not 
seasonally adjusted, Quarterly data, Eurostat, Extracted 05.09.14 
Total Investment             
(Germany/France/Spain/Italy) 
GDP and main components, Current Price, Gross fixed capital 
formation, Million Euro, not seasonally adjusted data, Eurostat, 
ESA2005 
Public Investment              
(publ) 
Quarterly non-financial accounts for general government, Gross 
Capital Formation, Million Euro, not seasonally adjusted data, 
Eurostat, Extracted 14.10.14 
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Private Investment        
        (priv) 
Total Investment - Public Investment 
Pil 
GDP and main components, Volumes, Gross Domestic Product at 
market prices, Million Euro, chain-linked volumes reference year 
2005, Seasonally adjusted and adjusted data by working days, 
Quarterly data, Eurostat, Extracted 09.11.14 
Current Account       
     (ca) 
Main Balance of Payments and International Investment position 
items as share of GDP, Quarterly data, Percentage of GDP, Eurostat, 
Extracted 08.09.14 
Total Employment                       
(em_tot) 
Employment by sex, age and economic activity, Total activities, 
Quarterly data, Eurostat, Extracted 22.10.14 
Industrial Employment     
                    (em_ind) 
Employment by sex, age and economic activity, Manufacturing, 
electricity, gas, water, Quarterly data, Eurostat, Extracted 22.10.14 
Dwellings Employment                                 
(em_dwe) 
Employment by sex, age and economic activity, Construction 
activities, Quarterly data, Eurostat, Extracted 22.10.14 
Disposable Income                                
(gdi) 
Gross Disposable Income (adj. D8) (millions euro), Households, 
European Sector Accounts, Quarterly data, Eurostat, Extracted 07.14 
Financial Assets                  
 (finass) 
Net Financial Assets (Million Euro), Households, European Sector 
Accounts, Quarterly data, Eurostat, Extracted 07.14 
Bond 10 years 
Bonds 10 years, Quarterly data, percent, Not Seasonally adjusted, 
OECD, Extracted 10.14 
Bond 3 months 
Bonds 3 months, Quarterly data, percent, Not Seasonally adjusted, 
OECD, Extracted 10.14 
Profit                                       
  (prof) 
Gross Operating Surplus + Gross Mixed Income (Million Euro), Non-
financial corporations key ratios and components, European Sector 
Accounts, Quarterly data, Not Seasonally adjusted, Eurostat, 
Extracted 07.14  
NB Profits of non-financial corporation are missing for Germany: as a 
proxy we use Gross operating surplus and gross mixed income as 
defined by National Account (S_ADJ) 
Consumption              
  (cind2) 
GDP and main components, Volumes, Final Consumption 
expenditure of households, Million Euro, chain-linked volumes 
reference year 2005, Seasonally adjusted and adjusted data by 
working days, Quarterly data, Eurostat, Extracted 09.11.14 
 
